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“THINKING OUTSIDE THE (TAX)
TREATY” REVISITED
Adam H. Rosenzweig*
he 2012 article entitled “Thinking Outside the (Tax)
Treaty” (“Thinking”)1 examined the state of international
tax relations among countries that had not entered into bilateral
tax treaties with each other. At the time, the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) had spent
over a decade pursuing a project to combat harmful tax compe-
tition,2with reportedly mixed results.3While most countries had
agreed to enter into Tax Information Sharing Agreements as a
result of the Harmful Tax Competition project, the consensus,
for the most part, was that the OECD effort had not completely
eliminated the problem of international tax competition.4 In
light of this, at the time, Thinking proposed that the interna-
tional tax community should consider developing a new multi-
national institution, one uniquely designed for international tax
and focused specifically on resolving disputes between states
that had not entered into a bilateral tax treaty with each other.5
The idea behind developing such an institution was that no sin-
gle regime could be crafted to appeal to all countries at the same
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1. Adam H. Rosenzweig, Thinking Outside the (Tax) Treaty, 2012 WIS. L.
REV. 717 (2012).
2. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], HARMFUL TAX
COMPETITION: AN EMERGINGGLOBAL ISSUE (1998).
3. See, e.g., Reuven Avi-Yonah, The OECD Harmful Tax Competition Re-
port: A Retrospective After a Decade, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 783 (2008); see also
Rosenzweig, supra note 1.
4. See, e.g., Steven A. Dean, The Incomplete Global Market for Tax Infor-
mation, 49 B.C. L REV. 605 (2008).
5. See generally Rosenzweig, supra note 1.
T
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time due to the differences in their economies, tax base, popula-
tion, and other attributes.6 Consequently, a second-best ap-
proach—with treaties among the most cooperative countries and
some form of a non-treaty mechanism among the other non-
treaty states—proved necessary. The ultimate goal was to find a
way to increase cooperation marginally among the noncoopera-
tive states under the existing international tax regime.
Since the publication of Thinking, the OECD has moved on to
address the challenge of fundamental international tax reform
through its Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project,
which continues to this day.7 Rather than represent a retreat
from the issue of global tax competition in the wake of the Harm-
ful Tax Competition project, the BEPS project represents an
even more ambitious approach to international tax reform. To
this end, the BEPS Action Plan announced fifteen unique action
items to consider as part of a comprehensive review of the entire
international tax regime, ranging from more technical issues
(such as dealing with the digital economy and fixing transfer
pricing)8 to more fundamental reforms (such as increasing tax
transparency, increasing multinational dispute resolution, and
even adopting a multilateral tax treaty).9 The BEPS Action Plan
represents a truly revolutionary and groundbreaking effort to
6. See, e.g., Adam H. Rosenzweig, Defining a Country’s “Fair Share” of
Taxes, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 373 (2014); Adam H. Rosenzweig, Why Are There
Tax Havens?, 52 WM. &MARY L. REV. 923 (2010).
7. See generally ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], ACTION
PLAN ON BASEEROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING (2013).
8. For example, one issue confronting the international tax community has
been how to allocate income from digital sales across borders. Assume a tax-
payer in the United States buys a computer program written in Canada and
downloads it over the internet from the server in Canada to a computer in the
United States. The question that arises is how to divide the income from the
sale between the United States and Canada. One reason this has proven diffi-
cult is that the traditional rules to divide income were based on physical pres-
ence, which has little meaning in the digital context. See id. at 14.
9. For example, the lack of transparency in tax information across borders
is one current issue facing the international tax community. Each country typ-
ically collects and processes its own tax information, such as tax returns, but
does not necessarily share that information with other countries. In turn, tax-
payers are able to exploit this lack of transparency to manipulate tax liability
across countries. Increasing transparency across borders could help address
this issue. See id. at 18.
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reform the international tax regime; in fact, it is the first at-
tempt to revisit the fundamental building blocks of the interna-
tional tax regime since its emergence in the early 1920s.
The development of BEPS highlights the need for a new insti-
tutional framework to implement the new, emerging regime of
international tax law.10 In turn, the BEPS project provides an
ideal opportunity to revisit the principles of Thinking and, in
particular, to question what role bilateral tax treaties can and
should play in a post-BEPS world. More specifically, there are
two reasons why tax treaties should be reevaluated in light of
BEPS. First, BEPS represents an attempt to create a new, truly
multinational consensus (at least among member states of the
OECD) over many, if not most, of the issues presently covered in
most existing tax treaties—a move that could render most of the
provisions embedded in existing tax treaties obsolete. Second,
BEPS represents a clear move toward a distinctly multilateral
tax instrument (and potentially a multinational tax institution)
and away from the idea of bilateral tax treaties as the primary
form of international coordination.11
Before it is possible to revisit the tax treaty in light of BEPS,
however, it is necessary to be precise in defining the scope and
breadth of a bilateral treaty.12 First, a bilateral tax treaty is in-
tended to permit countries to shift, on a bilateral basis, from a
primarily source-based system to a primarily residence-based
system.13 Bilateral tax treaties achieve this through the doctrine
of “permanent establishment,” in which each signatory country
agrees not to impose a tax on residents of the other country ab-
sent some significant and continuous presence in the other coun-
try.14 In turn, bilateral tax treaties lower the source-based taxes
on residents of the other signatory states.15 Second, bilateral tax
treaties coordinate the rules of the signatory states to minimize
the risk of both countries exercising their taxing power over a
10. See Adam H. Rosenzweig, Building a Framework for a Post-BEPS
World, 42 TAXNOTES INT’L 1077 (2014).
11. See, e.g., Pasquale Pistone, Coordinating the Action of Regional and
Global Players During the Shift from Bilateralism to Multilateralism in Inter-
national Tax Law, 6 WORLD TAX J. 3 (2014).
12. See generally Rebecca M. Kysar, On the Constitutionality of Tax Trea-
ties, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2013).
13. See Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at 742.
14. See U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION art. 5 (U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY 2006).
15. See, e.g., id. art. 10.
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single taxpayer or item of income (more colloquially referred to
as double-taxation relief, although that term is not precisely cor-
rect).16 Third, bilateral tax treaties establish a dispute resolution
mechanism to resolve disputes between the signatory states over
the application and interpretation of the treaty as to a particular
taxpayer or item of income.17
It is important to emphasize these three distinct roles of the
bilateral tax treaty before determining what role the bilateral
tax treaty can play in a post-BEPS world. Isolating out each of
these three distinct purposes can help identify why certain coun-
tries may choose not to enter into bilateral tax treaties with each
other. By identifying how and why different countries might not
enter into a bilateral tax treaty with each other, it can become
possible to identify and analyze precisely what conditions might
increase the possibility of cooperation between specific coun-
tries. For example, the United States and Brazil do not have a
bilateral tax treaty, primarily because the countries do not agree
on how to reconcile their rules on transfer pricing; by contrast,
the United States and the Cayman Islands do not have a bilat-
eral tax treaty, primarily because the United States has no in-
terest in lowering source-based taxes on payments to the Cay-
man Islands (a country with which the United States has virtu-
ally no international trade).18
The difficulty with the modern tax treaty is that it adopts an
all-or-nothing approach, meaning that the signatory countries
must agree on all three aspects before they can agree to enter
into a bilateral tax treaty. Consequently, due to the all-or-noth-
ing approach of the bilateral tax treaty, countries that might
agree on many of the goals of a bilateral tax treaty might still be
incapable of entering into a tax treaty with each other. The re-
sult is little to no cooperation between these countries (despite
potential agreement on a number of issues), precisely because
the bilateral tax treaty presently provides the only mechanism
for formal cooperation on tax matters between countries under
the existing regime. For example, countries that are not signa-
tories to a bilateral tax treaty have no formal means to enter into
a form of dispute resolution or coordination over baseline rules
when disputes over particular taxpayers arise. As a result, even
16. See, e.g., id. art. 4.
17. See, e.g., id. art. 25.
18. See Rosenzweig, supra note 1.
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minor disputes over international tax rules among such coun-
tries that might otherwise easily be resolved through some form
of dispute resolution mechanism can result in conflict.
Thinking attempted to address this problem by proposing a
non-treaty international tax dispute resolution mechanism that
could still benefit two countries that might agree on some as-
pects of a tax treaty but which are not parties to a bilateral tax
treaty. From this perspective, Thinking adopted the following
framework to analyze the role of bilateral tax treaties:
1. Bilateral tax treaties embody certain baseline rules under-
lying a cooperative international tax regime that benefit the
signatory countries;
2. Bilateral tax treaties provide a dispute resolution mecha-
nism to divide the tax revenue over a particular taxpayer or
item of income between two countries; and
3. Increased cooperation over baseline rules and dispute res-
olution creates a form of global public good that all countries
benefit from. Countries with a larger gross domestic product
(GDP) and greater amounts of international trade benefit from
this global public good more than poorer countries, and thus,
poorer countries have less of an incentive to contribute to the
development of the global public good.19
Under this framework, Thinking proposed the adoption of a non-
treaty-based dispute resolution mechanism to resolve disputes
among countries that have not entered into a bilateral tax treaty
as a way to incentivize both wealthier countries and poorer coun-
tries to bring claims before the non-treaty dispute resolution
mechanism.
The difficulty in accomplishing the proposal set forth in Think-
ing is to provide sufficient incentives for both sides to enter the
dispute resolution mechanism. The solution proposed in Think-
ing was to require poorer countries to agree to abide by certain
baseline rules (primarily those embodied in bilateral tax trea-
ties) to govern the dispute at issue in exchange for a presump-
tion (from a factual standpoint) in favor of the poorer countries
in resolving the dispute.20 The premise is that increasing coop-
eration on baseline rules will primarily benefit larger, wealthier
19. See Rosenzweig, supra note 1.
20. See id.
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countries, while the presumption over specific disputes will pri-
marily benefit smaller, poorer countries.21 In other words, the
non-treaty-based dispute resolution mechanismwould build into
the system a classic solution to a collective action problem (e.g.,
side payments) so as to increase cooperation among otherwise
noncooperative countries.
The theory underlying this framework is referred to as the
“weaker link” theory of global public goods, in which the total
amount of global public goods is determined in reference to the
least contributor rather than by the sum of total contributions.22
This theory is best exemplified by an analogy to a community
building a protective dike around a city, where each citizen con-
trols the construction of a portion of the dike on their land. The
entire city will be flooded if any one landowner does a poor job
building their portion of the dike or does not build the dike on
their land. The wealthiest landowners with the largest homes
would benefit the most from building the dike. Building a dike
is expensive, however, meaning the poorest landowners would
have little incentive to do so. By contrast, the wealthiest land-
owners have a large incentive to build the dike, but cannot do so
alone. Rather, they need the poorest to build the dike on their
land in order to protect their more valuable land. As becomes
readily apparent, the solution to the problem would be for the
wealthy landowners to pay the poorer landowners to build dikes
to protect the wealthy landowners.
The same is true of tax agreements: a modified version of side
payments can resolve the weaker-link collective action problem.
For example, Thinking proposed that the international tax re-
gime is a form of a weaker-link game, in which certain smaller,
poorer countries have little incentive to contribute to the global
public good of international tax cooperation, but wealthier coun-
tries need the poorer countries to cooperate to prevent the per-
nicious effects of harmful tax competition.23 Consequently, side
payments would resolve the problem. Thinking, however, as-
sumed, based on experience, that traditional side payments are
not a realistic option in the real world.24
Instead, Thinking proposed building an alternative form of
side payments into the regime itself through a dispute resolution
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id.
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mechanism.More specifically, the dispute resolution mechanism
would apply in a dispute over a particular taxpayer between two
non-treaty member countries (since a treaty-based dispute reso-
lution would not be available). The poorer of the two countries
would agree to abide by certain baseline rules, such as those pre-
sent in most tax treaties. For example, a country may agree to
information sharing and transfer pricing with respect to the tax-
payer at issue. In return, the wealthier country, much like a lit-
igant bearing the burden of persuasion in a trial, would agree to
a presumption in favor of the poorer country in resolving the dis-
pute. In this manner, the wealthier country receives cooperation
from the poorer country that it prefers and, in exchange, con-
cedes that close cases will come out in favor of the poorer coun-
try.
At the time of the publication of Thinking, the reaction to the
idea that large, developed countries should compromise on their
preferred international tax rules to make the overall interna-
tional tax regime more attractive to developing countries
(thereby increasing total cooperation) was, for the most part,
considered unrealistic, even if theoretically appealing.25 Since
that time, however, the idea of developing an international re-
gime targeted toward increasing participation by developing
countries has gained increased traction, with the BEPS Action
Plan calling for the consideration of the divergent interests of
developing countries as part of designing the rules of the overall
project (at least with respect to the so-called “BRIC” countries of
Brazil, Russia, India, and China).26 Consequently, BEPS can
provide the perfect opportunity to revisit the proposals of Think-
ing in light of this shift toward a more inclusive international
tax regime for all countries of the world.27
In a post-BEPS world, a number of the assumptions underly-
ing the framework in Thinking may no longer apply. More spe-
cifically, under the BEPS Action Plan, the ultimate goal of BEPS
is to shift from a competitive to a cooperative international tax
landscape by establishingmultilateral baseline rules that OECD
25. See Allison Christians, Getting to Yes? Thoughts on a BATNA for Inter-
national Tax, 2 WIS. L. REV. ONLINE 7 (2013).
26. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, A Perspective on Supra-Nationality in
Tax Law (U. of Mich. Law Sch., Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No.
14-019, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2508869.
27. See Adam H. Rosenzweig, An Antigua-Gambling Model for the Interna-
tional Tax Regime, 44 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 79 (2014).
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member states will agree on, such as transfer pricing, the digital
economy, and amultilateral tax instrument to increase coopera-
tion on these issues.28 If successful, the focus on multilateral
rules could result in the promulgation of a multilateral instru-
ment that could well replace the bilateral tax treaty as the pri-
mary instrument for international tax cooperation. Assuming
that BEPS, if fully implemented, would mean the end of the bi-
lateral tax treaty as we know it, what does that mean for the
non-treaty-based mechanism described in Thinking? Rather
than ring its death knell, a fully implemented BEPS could actu-
ally make a non-treaty international tax dispute resolution
mechanism not only more important but also easier to imple-
ment and potentially more effective.
This could be the case precisely because there would still be
issues that a non-treaty international tax dispute resolution
mechanism could address that may not be addressed, even with
a multilateral tax instrument. At least at the outset, it is un-
likely that every country of the world would agree to the entirety
of BEPS, including signing a multilateral tax instrument. Ab-
sent the agreement of every country in the world, the potential
for harmful tax competition could still arise.29 Yet, if agreeing to
baseline rules truly is a form of global public good, it would be
beneficial to have more countries join the regime rather than
less. Thus, some mechanism that would increase the amount of
cooperation from those countries that are unwilling to fully com-
mit to all the aspects of BEPS would only increase the overall
effectiveness of BEPS.30
The real benefit of BEPS is that, by its own terms, it estab-
lishes new multinational baseline norms for the modern inter-
national tax regime. Thus, BEPS directly solves one of the more
difficult challenges facing the proposal in Thinking—finding a
consensus over the baseline rules derived from bilateral tax trea-
ties. While many people agree that bilateral tax treaties do rep-
resent some form of consensus on norms, there is little consensus
28. See Yariv Brauner, What the BEPS?, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 55 (2014).
29. See May Elsayyad & Kai A. Konrad, Fighting Multiple Tax Havens, 86
J. INT’LECON. 295 (2012); see also Rosenzweig, supra note 1.
30. Cf. Itai Grinberg, Taxing Capital Income in Emerging Countries: Will
FATCA Open the Door?, 5 WORLD TAX J. 325 (2013).
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that the network of bilateral tax treaties represents clearly de-
fined and agreed-upon international baseline rules.31 BEPS, on
the other hand, is a multinational effort by all member states of
the OECD (and potentially the G20).32 While each state may
need to adopt implementing legislation domestically, for the first
time, BEPS represents an effort both to agree on the underlying
baseline norms from a multinational standpoint and to imple-
ment them through specific rules. By contrast, bilateral tax trea-
ties can, at most, only implement specific rules between signa-
tory countries with implicit underlying baseline norms (i.e.,
norms developed through commentary on the OECD Model
treaty).
From this perspective then, the framework of Thinking could
be updated for a post-BEPS world as follows:
1. BEPS embodies certain baseline rules underlying a cooper-
ative international tax regime that benefit the signatory coun-
tries;
2. Signatories to BEPS adopt a dispute resolution mechanism
to divide the tax revenue over a particular taxpayer or item of
income between two countries; and
3. Increased cooperation from the multilateral baseline rules
and dispute resolution mechanism creates a form of global pub-
lic good from which all countries can benefit. Countries with a
larger GDP and greater amounts of international trade would
benefit from this global public goodmore than poorer countries,
and thus, poorer countries have less of an incentive to agree to
BEPS.
From this perspective, an alternative post-BEPS dispute resolu-
tion mechanism could be established to address specific disputes
between OECD member states on the one hand and countries
that do not agree to sign BEPS on the other. In this manner,
OECDmember states would then benefit from getting non-mem-
ber states to agree to at least some of the baseline rules of BEPS
31. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Who Invented the Single Tax Principle:
An Essay on the History of US Treaty Policy, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 305 (2014–
2015).
32. The G20 is an international group consisting of foreign ministers of the
twenty largest world economies that discusses international fiscal and mone-
tary matters. See About G20, G20.ORG (Nov. 27, 2015),
http://www.g20.org/Eng-
lish/aboutg20/AboutG20/201511/t20151127_1609.html.
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(under some circumstances), while non-member states would
benefit from the increased certainty of tax benefits delivered to
particular taxpayers.
An example could be illustrative. The following example is
taken substantially from Thinking:
Assume a U.S. corporation has active operations in multiple
countries throughout the world but maintains two separate
special purpose entities [in non-BEPS signatory countries]: an
intellectual property holding company in Brazil and an inter-
nal finance company in Andorra. Under U.S. international tax
law, the corporation allocates income to these companies under
the arm’s-length method of allocation . . . .
A dispute arises with respect to the allocation of income among
these entities among the states involved. The United States ac-
cuses the U.S. parent of artificially paying higher rates to An-
dorra and Brazil to “shift” income to these lower tax jurisdic-
tions . . . .
More specifically, assume that the U.S. parent earns
$10,000,000 in gross revenue from worldwide sales, but then
claims to the United States that it pays $3,000,000 in interest
to the Andorran entity and $4,000,000 in royalties to the Bra-
zilian entity. Since those are both deductible in the United
States, that leaves only $3,000,000 of net income subject to
U.S. tax. The United States in response argues that under an
arm’s length standard only $1,000,000 of interest should have
been paid to Andorra and only $1,000,000 in royalties should
have been paid to the Brazilian entity. As a result, the United
States proposes to unilaterally impose tax on the additional
$5,000,000 of income, without being able to know whether this
would result in double taxation or whether it would prefer to
impose tax on this amount from a normative standpoint . . . .
The taxpayer, not wanting the United States to impose a sec-
ond tax on the $5,000,000, petitions Andorra and Brazil to chal-
lenge the United States pursuant to the mechanism. Assume
both Andorra and Brazil do so and petition that a panel be cre-
ated pursuant to the mechanism to challenge the assertion by
the United States to tax the $5,000,000.33
As discussed above, assume the non-treaty dispute resolution
mechanism is in place that could serve as a form of arbitration
for non-treaty member states. The poorer country in a dispute
33. See Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at 775.
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would be required to concede certain baseline rules as a condi-
tion to utilizing the mechanism. The wealthier country in a dis-
pute would be required to concede to a rebuttable presumption
in favor of the poorer country as a condition to utilizing the
mechanism. The rebuttable presumption would work in the
same way rebuttable presumptions work in any dispute or
trial—the party with the presumption in its favor will win unless
the opposing part can provide sufficient evidence to overcome
the presumption. Thus, if the wealthier country fails to provide
sufficient factual support in its favor to overcome the presump-
tion in favor of the poorer country, it would lose the dispute. If
the poorer country refused to comply with the baseline rules,
however, it would lose the benefit of the presumption in its favor.
With respect to Brazil, assume BEPS establishes a baseline
rule on how to allocate income from intellectual property based
on some combination of research and development (R&D) costs,
management and operation costs, and sales and license fees.
Also assume that one of the reasons Brazil did not sign BEPS
was that it preferred to use its own formulary apportionment
method for intellectual property. Finally, assume that all of the
R&D costs were incurred in the United States, but most of the
management and operation costs and license fees were located
in Brazil (and that each of the parties agree to these assump-
tions). Prior to using the dispute resolution mechanism, Brazil
would have to agree to apply the BEPS rule on transfer pricing
for intellectual property to the specific dispute at hand (and only
to that specific dispute). In turn, the United States would agree
to a rebuttable presumption in favor of Brazil. To attempt to re-
but the presumption, the United States would then argue that
under the BEPS standard, the R&D costs should carry more
weight when settling the dispute at hand, while Brazil would
argue that the management and operation costs should carry
more weight. Since both positions are acceptable alternatives
under BEPS, Brazil’s argument would prevail because the
United States would have failed to rebut the presumption.
With respect to Andorra, by contrast, there would not be any
dispute over the methodology to be used since both jurisdictions
have adopted the arm’s length method. Rather, the dispute
would be over the ability of Andorra to accept the transfer price
amount chosen by the taxpayer without requiring independent
support, as opposed to the United States, which would prefer an
independent transfer pricing study to be performed. Assume
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here that BEPS establishes a baseline rule of complete transpar-
ency on transfer pricing that requires countries to share under-
lying support for the preferred transfer price. Andorra would
need to agree to comply with the baseline rule to have access to
the mechanism (which would mean sharing all of its information
supporting the transfer price). Since it did not request any sup-
porting information, however, it would not have any information
to share supporting its preferred transfer price. By contrast, the
United States would provide all of its support in favor of its pre-
ferred transfer price. Assuming this evidence is substantial, the
United States would be successful in rebutting the presumption
in favor of Andorra and would thus prevail. Alternatively, if An-
dorra refused to comply with the BEPS transparency rule, the
presumption would not apply, and the United States would also
win the dispute. Either way, the United States would win, de-
spite the presumption in favor of Andorra, because Andorra
failed to comply with the baseline rules of BEPS.
Taken together, establishing a dispute resolution mechanism
for countries that do not fully sign BEPS would not undermine
the success of BEPS; rather, it could increase the benefits that
BEPS provides by extending them, at least on a case-by-case ba-
sis, to all countries around the world. This result holds, at least
as an initial matter, so long as there exists at least one country
in the world that does not agree to sign on to the entirety of
BEPS, which seems like a relatively safe assumption. By agree-
ing to exchange specific factual disputes in exchange for comply-
ing with BEPS baseline rules, OECD member states would offer
an incentive to non-member states, at a minimum, to participate
in a dispute resolution mechanism, even if they do not want to
sign BEPS as a whole. In turn, non-member states would have
an incentive to concede to certain BEPS baseline rules, at least
on a case-by-case basis, in order to win a greater share of dis-
putes before the dispute resolution mechanism. In effect, a non-
member dispute resolution mechanism could lead to a form of
second-best harmonization in the post-BEPS international tax
regime. Thus, while such a dispute resolution mechanism may
not be as ideal from the perspective of the OECDmember states,
such a result is preferable to the risk of potentially undermining
the success of BEPS altogether.
A similar approach has proven quite successful in the World
Trade Organization (WTO) with respect to what is typically re-
ferred to as “cross-retaliation.” Under cross-retaliation, a WTO
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member state that wins a dispute before the WTO under one
agreement under the purview of the WTO may, under certain
circumstances, retaliate under a different agreement that is also
under the purview of theWTO.34 The typical justification for per-
mitting cross-retaliation is that the threat of retaliation under
the particular agreement by a small country against a large one
is insufficient to induce compliance, but retaliation under a dif-
ferent agreement might. For example, in response to a recent
violation of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
by the United States, the country of Antigua and Barbuda re-
cently won permission from the WTO to cross-retaliate against
the United States under the Agreement on Trade-Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). More specifically,
the United States was found to be in violation of GATS for adopt-
ing a law that banned online gambling conducted by companies
outside the United States yet permitted certain remote gambling
in some cases conducted by companies within the United States.
The United States, however, refused to comply with the WTO
ruling, which required the United States to change its law. In
turn, Antigua and Barbuda was permitted by the WTO to retal-
iate under TRIPS for the U.S. violation of GATS. More specifi-
cally, the WTO ruled that Antigua and Barbuda would no longer
be required to enforce U.S. copyright laws under TRIPS due to
the U.S. violation of GATS (although only up to the value of the
harm incurred).35 In short, cross-retaliation permitted Antigua
and Barbuda to retaliate under TRIPS in response to a violation
of GATS by the United States.
Taken together, it appears that the approach taken in Think-
ing, in light of a world in which the OECD Harmful Tax Compe-
tition effort did not achieve all of its intended goals and BEPS
was not yet undertaken, could not only survive the implementa-
tion of BEPS but could actually prove more effective in achieving
its goals in a post-BEPS world. Ultimately then, the lesson of
Thinking—that increasing cooperation of the least cooperative
states in the world is as important, if not more important, to the
ultimate success of the international tax regime as cooperation
among the largest, most cooperative states—can prove increas-
ingly relevant in a modern, globalized world. The alternative—
ignoring least cooperative states and hoping that they either
34. See Rosenzweig, supra note 27.
35. See id.
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eventually sign BEPS and/or happen to disappear from the in-
ternational tax scene—could potentially undermine the ultimate
success of BEPS as the foundation for a new international tax
regime. For these reasons, a non-BEPS dispute resolution mech-
anism—whether housed in the OECD, the WTO, or otherwise—
should be considered as a fundamental part of any institutional
framework for a post-BEPS world.36
36. See Rosenzweig, supra note 10.
